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DILEMMIC ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF "CONSTITUTIONAL FACT"
FRANK R. STRONG*
The doctrine of "constitutional fact" requires that the United States
Supreme Court make an independent examination into facts "decisive
of constitutional issues." Although the doctrine fell into disrepute in
the 192 0's and 1930's when employed in judicial review of economic
regulation, it has been revived in cases involving civil liberties, notably
cases involving determinations of obscenity for first amendment pur-
poses. The author reviews the decisions of the 1967 Term of the Su-
preme Court and concludes that the doctrine enjoys continuing vitality,
He suggests, however, that its expanding use may increase to crisis.
proportions the Court's already burdensome workload.
In earlier pages of this Law Review there appeared a demonstration
of the persistence of the doctrine of "constitutional fact."' While exhaus-
ting to the reader, the article did not exhaust the subject. Yet it was
sufficiently inclusive to establish the fact of continuing vitality of a doc-
trine that leading writers have long attempted to consign to constitutional
oblivion. Accordingly, the present article will not essay further proof
save to slip in a footnote calling attention to the confirming line of cases
involving alleged prosecutorial toleration of false testimony.2 Rather,
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Dean and Professor of Law
Emeritus, The Ohio State University.
1 Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv.
223 (1968).
2 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimous opinion by Stewart, J., re-
versing on basis of Court's own evaluation of uncontradicted evidence produced
on habeas corpus); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (unanimous opinion
by Warren, C.J., reversing state supreme court after an independent evaluation
of the facts) ; Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., for ma-
jority affirms judgment of conviction but only after independent examination
of the record; Black, Douglas and Murphy, JJ., dissent after a reexamination
of the record highlighted by inclusion in appendix form of evidential material).
See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). By far the strongest statement
on the doctrine is that of Chief Justice Warren in Napue. He first rejects the
State's claim that under Hysler the Court is "not free to reach a factual conclu-
sion different from that reached by the Illinois Supreme Court .... This Court
made its own 'independent examination' of the allegations there to determine if
they had in fact met the Florida standard. ... ." 360 U.S. at 271. Continuing, the
Chief Justice asserted that "the duty of this Court to make its own independent
examination of the record when federal constitutional deprivations are alleged is
clear, resting, as it does, on our solemn responsibility for maintaining the Con-
stitution inviolate." Id. There follow in the text general citations to Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
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this sequel is written because developments since the preparation of the
basic analysis further highlight the current strength of the doctrine and
the dilemmic aspects of its persistence.
THE DOCTRINE PERSISTS AT THE 1967 TERm
Pre-Mirandad cases of alleged coerced confession continue to reach
the Supreme Court. Of those at the 1967 Term, four, all per curiam,
disclose no disposition on the part of the Court to forsake the doctrine
of constitutional fact.4 In none does the Court resolve issues of disputed
testimony, nor does any rank as a major determination. Yet each reflects
the Court's sense of an inescapable responsibility to make an independent
examination of the record,5 and the very absence of lengthy opinions in
reversal suggests adherence to quite settled doctrine.
After conflict within the Court concerning the scope of review of
constitutional facts in cases of alleged discrimination in jury composition,
(1958), and quotations articulating the doctrine from Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951), and Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110,
121 (1954). The text is then supplemented by a footnote citing to sixteen ex-
pressions of the doctrine, two in dissenting opinions, and tracing recognition of
the principle back to Mr. Justice Holmes in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24
(1923).
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390
U.S. 519 (1968); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); Beecher v. Alabama,
389 U.S. 35 (1967); cf. Johnson v. Massachusetts, 390 U.S. 511 (1968).
' In the Greenwald per curiam decision the Court refers to the need to make
"an examination of the record," 390 U.S. at 520, which is surely elliptical for
"our own examination of the record," the language employed in Brooks. 389
U.S. at 415. There is no such expression in either of the other per curiams, yet
context and supporting citations serve the same function. Thus in Beecher the
Court states :
[W]e need not resolve this evidentiary conflict, for even if we accept as
accurate the State's version of what transpired there, the uncontroverted
facts set forth above lead to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner's
confessions were involuntary. See Davis v. North Carolina . . . . [A]
realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case compels the conclusion
that this petitioner's confessions were the product of gross coercion.
389 U.S. at 37-38. And in Darwin Mr. Justice Harlan is "unable to agree with
the basis on which the Court reverses petitioner's conviction . . . . I cannot join
the Court in what seems to me no more than a substitution of its view on a
close factual question for that of the state courts." 391 U.S. at 350. Mr. Justice
White, dissenting separately without opinion, does not disclose whether he is now
opposing the doctrine of "constitutional fact." Dissent was also registered in
Greenwald and Johnson but there is no indication in either that any member of
the Court is questioning the doctrine. The fact that in Beecher four Justices shift
the constitutional basis for intervention from Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1935), to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), has no significance for the
matter under present consideration.
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Whitus v. GeorgiaP recently returned to the rule of Norris v. Alabamda
and Pierre v. Louisianas that even disputed facts of constitutional per-
tinency must be examined and determined by the Court independently
of prior inquiry and solution by state courts.' The decision was unan-
imous, the judicial language unmistakable. At the 1967 Term, Whitus
figured in six per curiams. Three Georgia convictions were overturned
on direct citation of it without more.1" In a fourth case from Georgian
and in one from Alabama,'2 reversal and remand resulted from the
Court's findings that petitioners' prima facie cases of discrimination had
not been rebutted. Norris and Whitus were both cited in the review of
the Georgia conviction, but only Norris in the other. However, it was
in the Alabama per curiam that there appears the language of "constitu-
tional fact": "On our independent examination of the record, we are
unable to discover any evidence adduced by the State adequate to rebut
petitioner's prima facie case."' 3 Supreme Court review in a third case
involving issues of burden of proof resulted in a stalemate, four Justices
voting for reversal, four taking the position that certiorari to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals had been improvidently granted, and Mr. Justice
Marshall not sitting.14
In decisions of the 1967 Term involving substantive civil liberties,
the "constitutional fact" doctrine enjoyed varying emphases of reaffirma-
tion. The extremes came in extensions of New York Times v. Sullivan."
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks' applied to newspaper libel of a
clerk of court and St. Amant v. Thompson'7 to libel of a deputy sheriff
by a candidate for United States Senator, the Times rule of "reckless
disregard for truth or falsity." Technically, reversal and remand were
in each instance grounded upon misapplication of the governing malice
standard by the respective state supreme courts.' Yet for the doctrine
6 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
'294 U.S. 587 (1935).8306 U.S. 354 (1939).
0 The jury discrimination cases up to the 1967 Term of Court are discussed
in Strong, supra note 1, at 244-49.
"0 Sullivan v. Georgia, 390 U.S. 410 (1968); Anderson v. Georgia, 390 U.S.
206 (1968) ; Cobb v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 12 (1967).
'Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967).
1 Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967).
2 Id. at 23.
"Anderson v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 456 (1968).
376 U.S. 245 (1964). The Times and immediately subsequent libel cases
are considered in Strong, supra note 1, at 267-70.
"389 U.S. 81 (1967).17390 U.S. 727 (1968).
"Mr. Justice Fortas dissented in St. Anzant, convinced that "under New York
19691
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under study there is significance in the manner in which the Court's
opinions indicate extensive and intensive examination of the respective
records.
1 9
In contrast to these somewhat tangential treatments is Mr. Justice
Marshall's disposition, for all but Mr. Justice White, of Pickering v.
Board of Education."° Again reversing and remanding, this time with
respect to a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the Court extended
New York Times to a
case in which a teacher has made erroneous statements upon issues
then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of his
ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed
to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance
of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the reg-
ular operation of the schools generally.21
An appendix to the opinion of the Court, after setting forth Mr. Picker-
ing's Letter to the Editor, critical of his superintendent and the local board,
proceeds to an analysis of that letter. Whereas the board, after the re-
quired hearing on its dismissal of Mr. Pickering, had found eight prin-
cipal statements to be false, "[o]ur independent review of the record
convinces us" that only four of the eight were false and that the falsity
was "perfectly consistent with good-faith error .. .""2 To the statement
that the Court made its own independent examination of the record was
appended a two paragraph footnote worthy of quotation in full:
This Court has regularly held that where constitutional rights are
in issue an independent examination of the record will be made in order
that the controlling legal principles may be applied to the actual
facts of the case. E.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). However, in cases
where the upholding or rejection of a constitutional claim turns on
the resolution of factual questions, we also consistently give great, if
not controlling, weight to the findings of the state courts. In the pres-
ent case the trier of fact was the same body that was also both the
Times, this libel was broadcast with 'actual malice' . . . ." 390 U.S. at 734. In
H-anks he took no part. In each case Black and Douglas, JJ., concurred in result,
consistent with the position taken by them in Times.
11 In Hanks the Court was satisfied of the lack of actual malice by "[o]ur
examination of the whole record . . . ." 389 U.S. at 83. The prevailing opinion
in St. Amant devotes two paragraphs to "facts in this record" which "support
our view." 390 U.S. at 733.
2 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
21 Id. at 572-73.
"Id. at 578, 582.
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victim of appellant's statements and the prosecutor that brought the
charges aimed at securing his dismissal. The state courts made no
independent review of the record but simply contented themselves with
ascertaining, in accordance with statute, whether there was substantial
evidence to support the Board's findings.
Appellant requests us to reverse the state court's decisions uphold-
ing his dismissal on the independent ground that the procedure followed
above deprived him of due process in that he was not afforded an im-
partial tribunal. However, appellant makes this contention for the
first time in this Court, not having raised it at any point in the state
proceedings. Because of this, we decline to treat appellant's claim as
an independent ground for our decision in this case. On the other
hand, we do not propose to blind ourselves to the obvious defects in
the fact-finding process occasioned by the board's multiple func-
tioning vis-a-vis appellant. Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Accordingly, since
the state courts have at no time given de novo consideration to the state-
ments in the letter, we feel free to examine the evidence in this case
completely independently and to afford little weight to the factual de-
terminations made by the Board.23
By laying emphasis on the second sentence, the first portion of this
footnote could be read as weakening the doctrine of "constitutional fact"
in Supreme Court review of state court dispositions not involving appeal
from administrative action characterized by a blending of function. How-
ever, there is good reason to doubt such intent. The cases cited in support
of the assertion of the first sentence are leading decisions of that exact
type. And while judicial language is available from the 1950's to support
the second sentence, none is cited, suggesting that the caveat serves more
as a polite nod to the period of Justice Frankfurter's maximum influence
on the issue of scope of review than as an intended present cloud on the
inconsistent position taken in the preceding sentence. There is also ex-
trinsic support for this view in statements appearing in opinions in two
contemporaneous cases. One is Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent in Ginsberg
v. New York 4 Critical of the majority for refusing to face and resolve
the question of the obscenity or non-obscenity of the "girlie" magazines
for a youth of sixteen, the Justice observes that "this Court has made
strong and comprehensive statements about its duty in First Amendment
cases-statements with which I agree."2  A footnote quotation from
Jacobellis v. Ohio20 makes it doubly clear that this duty is that of "making
23 Id. at 578-79 n.2.
2390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2
" Id. at 672.
20 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964).
1969]
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an independent judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the
material involved is constitutionally protected."27 There is no inkling
here that Mr. Justice Fortas believes the Court to be backing away from
the doctrine of "constitutional fact." Quite the contrary, he asserts his
agreement with what he takes to be accepted doctrine and challenges only
the Court's disposition of the case on the technical ground that Ginsberg's
attorney did not choose to assail the conviction for want of obscenity in
the magazines." Decided the same day as Ginsberg was Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas.2 9 In overturning a motion picture licensing
ordinance on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness, Mr. Justice Marshall
for the Court made the observation that "to the extent that vague stan-
dards do not sufficiently guide the censor, the problem is not cured by
affording de novo judicial review." 30 Although negative in character,
there is here a judicial assumption that the doctrine of "constitutional
fact" remains intact.
Certainly the remainder of Pickering's footnote 2 is clear on the
application of the "constitutional fact" doctrine where "the trier of fact
was the same body that was also both the victim of appellant's statements
and the prosecufto 'iliat brought the charges aimed at securing his dis-
missal."'31 Clearly rejected is the pertinency of the substantial evidence
rule, application of which by the state's highest court led to its affirmance
of the administrative dismissal. Even more, the usual phraseology of the
"constitutional fact" rule is invigorated by addition of an adverb: the
evidence in the case is to be reviewed by the Court "completely indepen-
dently." 2 This emphasis upon complete independence in appraisal of
the record in the circumstances of the Pickering litigation is reminiscent
of the distinction between trial de novo and independent factual judgment
made in the original Big Four cases of Ben Avon, 3  Fung Ho,34 Cro-
well,35 and St. JosepY 0 The Court is not now suggesting literal trial
de novo for the Pickering type of case, but it is asserting the need for
an independent independent judgment by it of the facts controlling con-
" 390 U.S. at 672-73.281d.
" 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
30 Id. at 685.
" 391 U.S. at 579 n.2.32d.
"Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
"Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
' Crowell v. Benson, 286 U.S. 22 (1932).
" St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). See
Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Adininistrative-Consti-
tutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. Ray. 249, 272 (1967).
[Vol. 47
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stitutionality. This is only the second instance, Manual Enterprises v.
Day17 having been the first, wherein the reconstructed Court has fully
considered the doctrine of "constitutional fact" in the context of an ad-
ministrative record.3
8
However, the Court's remands in Watts v. Seward School Board9
and Puentes v. Board of Education40 for further consideration in light
of Pickering, together with the distinct possibility that the litigation in
Meehan v. Macy41 will ultimately reach the Court, presage for the Court's
docket additional cases involving different types of administrative bodies
and differing degrees of functional and procedural desiderata in admin-
istrative adjudication. A feature of Watts is consistent decisions at
two administrative levels, local and state, followed by affirmance in two
courts, first instance and appellate, on the basis of the substantial evi-
dence supporting the original administrative finding of immoral conduct
as defined by Alaska statute.42 Meehan also involves multiple determina-
tion, administrative as well as judicial. The trial court's action was on
motion for summary judgment; on appeal, the dissent, stressing the "ex-
ceedingly narrow" scope of review "in a case of this type,"" appears
from a reading of the majority opinion to reflect a conflict within that court
over the applicability of the substantial evidence test at the judicial stage
after reliance upon it at the appellate administrative level. In Puenrtes,
a divided New York Court of Appeals expressly rested on the substantial
evidence test its affirmance of the appellate division's confirmation, by
split vote, of the determination of the local school board that the critical
letter addressed to the board by Puentes in his capacity as president of the
local federation of teachers was "defamatory, malicious and false."4 4
That in cases such as these the Court will insist upon an independent
judgment with respect to facts decisive of constitutionality is attested by
the continuing strength of the doctrine of "constitutional fact" disclosed
at the 1967 Term.4 5 That strength is such that a current brief by a group
"370 U.S. 478 (1962), discussed in Strong, supra note 1, at 273-74.
'8 Consideration in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, discussed in the
preceding paragraph, was quite tangential.
"391 U.S. 592 (1968).
,088 S.Ct. 2271 (1968).
,392 F.2d 822 (D.C. App. 1968).
"See the lengthy, detailed opinion of the Supreme Court of Alaska, one judge
dissenting, in Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1968).
392 F.2d at 839-40 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
"Puentes v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 906, 223 N.E.2d 45, 276 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1966), motion to amend remittitur granted, 19 N.Y.2d 809, 226 N.E.2d 701,
279 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1967).
"' Beyond the evidence of that strength reviewed in the text are three miscel-
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of distinguished lawyers, filed in a United States Court of Appeals, could
assert,
Where, as here, constitutional issues of moment emerge from mixed
questions of fact and law, the authority of an appellate court to take
an independent view of the whole record is plain. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of the United States has taken such a view even in cases coming
from the state courts, over which the Supreme Court does not have a
general superintending power analogous to this court's power over the
Court of General Sessions. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131
(1965) .6
The only hint of weakness in the doctrine is to be found in Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence-dissent in the 1967 Term's obscenity deci-
sions.47 There, after pointing to a sharp divergence in the current Court
as to the proper application of the standards of Roth,48 Memoirs,4 and
Ginzburg v. United States," he observed:
There are also differences among us as to how our appellate process
should work in reviewing obscenity determinations. One view is that
we should simply examine the proceedings below to ascertain whether
the lower federal or state courts have made a genuine effort to apply
the Roth-Memoirs-Ginsburg tests, and that if such is the case, their
determinations that the questioned material is obscene should be ac-
cepted, much as would any findings of fact. Another view is that the
laneous per curiams in which the Court, upon its own independent examination
of the entire record, remanded to one state and two federal courts. McBride v.
Smith, 390 U.S. 411 (1968); Jones v. Russell, 390 U.S. 199 (1968); Robison v.
United States 390 U.S. 198 (1968). The significance of these actions for the
doctrine under consideration may be clouded by the fact that in each instance
the Court was moved as well by representations of a legal officer of each prose-
cuting jurisdiction-the Attorney General of Tennessee and the Solicitor General
of the United States. On the other hand, these actions of the Court may signal
some expansion of the doctrine; their evaluation is difficult.
" Brief for Appellant at 22, Kinoy v. District of Columbia, 400 F.2d 761
(D.C. Cir. 1968), filed by Anthony G. Amsterdam of Philadelphia, Philip J.
Hirschkop of Alexandria, Virginia, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and Thomas P. Sulli-
van of Chicago, John de J. Pemberton, Jr., of New York City, and Morton Stavis
of Newark, New Jersey. This was an appeal by professor and practitioner Kinoy
from a conviction under the District's disorderly conduct statute for vigorous
professional advocacy in behalf of his client before the House Un-American
Activities Committee. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968), discussed
at p. 316 supra.a Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
" A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).50383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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question of whether particular material is obscene inherently entails
a constitutional judgment for which the Court has ultimate respon-
sibility, and hence that it is incumbent upon us to judge for ourselves,
de novo as it were, the obscenity vel non of the challenged matter.51
A reference back to the earlier study will disclose the basis for the
Justice's observation. 2 He is quite correct; the conflict in viewpoint that
marked the opinions in Jacobellis has not been as definitively resolved
in favor of the doctrine as Whitus has done for the jury-discrimination
cases. Despite this, however, the writer adheres to the view that all but
one, possibly two, of the sitting Justices "have recently felt an obligation,
however distasteful and frustrating, to make an independent judgment
on the facts as to whether challenged materials are within or without
the Roth test of obscenity." '53 Certainly there is no indication that Mr.
Justice Harlan himself proposes to abandon his strong support of the
doctrine although, concerned about the heavy burden which it imposes
upon the Court, he is in search of a solution to the problem thus pre-
sented.
NEW OCCASIONS FOR TIE DOCTRINE AT THE 1967 TERM
Decisions of the Supreme Court at the 1967 Term disclose con-
tinuation of constitutional line-drawing at points and in terms that make
economic, physical, psychological, social, and other types of fact neces-
sarily decisive, wholly or in large part, of issues of constitutionality. This
is true both in the sense of adherence to pre-established constitutional
principle and in that of extensions thereof, as is illustrated by the jury-
discrimination and libel decisions reviewed in the first section of this
article. Further illustrations abound.
With respect to procedural guarantees, Fontaine v. California4 and
Johnson v. Florida5  apply recently established constitutional doctrine.
The latter invoked the Thompson v. City of Louisville56 rule that a judg-
ment devoid of evidentiary support violates a basic concept of due process;
the former applied the invigorated Chapman v. Californi 57 standard that
constitutional error, to be deemed harmless, must be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The decisiveness of a factual judgment in each of these
51390 U.S. at 706-07.
Strong, supra note 1, at 270-79.
' Id. at 279.
'390 U.S. 593 (1968).
- 391 U.S. 596 (1968).
56362 U.S. 199 (1960).
"'386 U.S. 18 (1967).
1969]
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situations is clear. In re Gault58 constituted the basis, in In re Whit-
tington, 9 for vacation and remand of state court affirmance of a juvenile
court determination of delinquency. Whittington's constitutional claims
were numerous, including several with respect to which facts would be
decisive of constitutionality."0
The substantive civil liberty areas of desegregation and picketing not
surprisingly continued to present the Court with problems in the appli-
cation of earlier decisions basic to those respective areas. Toward the
end of the term three school programs, two based on "freedom of choice"
and one on "free transfer," were held inadequate under Brown v. Board
of Education." Yet by declining to rule that either of these bases is
ipso facto invalid, the Court left constitutionality to be determined in
each challenged program on its precise and particular facts. Thus in
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners :62
We do not hold that "free transfer" can have no place in a de-
segregation plan. But like "freedom of choice," if it cannot be shown
that such a plan will further rather than delay conversion to a unitary,
nonracial, nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held unaccep-
table. See Green v. County School Board .... 63
The language in Green was that
[W]e do not hold that "freedom of choice" can have no place
in such a plan. We do not hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan might
of itself be unconstitutional, although that argument has been urged
upon us. Rather, all we decide today is that in desegregating a dual
system a plan utilizing "freedom of choice" is not an end in itself.04
Clearly, under such a view, constitutionality or unconstitutionality will
turn on close factual determinations.
Out of the landmark decision in Thornhill v. AlabaaP5 has come a
" 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
°391 U.S. 341 (1968).
" The claim of denial of jury trial anticipated Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), decided the same day and discussed at p. 323 infra. The assertion of
lack of an impartial tribunal is grounded in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Absence of an adequate standard of proof re-invokes the rule of Thompson v. City
of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
"347 U.S. 483 (1954). The three programs were held inadequate in: Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice"); Raney v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (same); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391
U.S. 450 (1968) ("free transfer").
6391 U.S. 450 (1968).
63 Id. at 459.
"Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1968).
'6310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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spate of litigation concerning the extent of constitutional protection of
picketing. Among other now-established propositions, the picketing must
be peaceful and it must not obstruct general ingress and egress with
respect to premises literally or constructively public in character. These
propositions were reaffirmed by Cameron v. Johnson,66 which sustained,
against a claim of voidness for overbreadth, a Mississippi statute care-
fully limited to picketing or mass demonstrations obstructive of access to
public buildings or public ways.17 Shortly thereafter the Court announced
its decision in Local 590, Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Val-
ley Plaza, 8 in which it overturned state court enjoinment of peaceful
picketing of a shopping center supermarket that "was carried out almost
entirely in the parcel pickup area and that portion of the parking lot im-
mediately adjacent thereto."6 9 For, "[a]lthough some congestion of the
parcel pickup area occurred, such congestion was sporadic and infre-
quent."" The analogy to Marsh v. Alabama,71 on which the majority re-
lied for their premise that the picketed area was public-like in character,
received vigorous challenge at the hands of Justices Black and White,
the former characterizing the situation before the Court as not within
Marsh "even by the wildest stretching... ."" But whether Amalgamated
represents application of settled or of new constitutional principle, it is
clear that a factual judgment controls the issue of validity or invalidity.
The intertwinement of speech and conduct that marks picketing is
characteristic of much that now crowds for protection under the first
amendment. At the 1967 Term the Court faced an emotionally charged
facet in determining the constitutionality of the 1965 amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, which subjects to crim-
inal liability the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft cards. In
United States v. O'Brien,3 with only Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting,
the Court refused to bring O'Brien's burning of his draft card within
the "symbolic speech" protected by the Constitution. "We cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby
::390 U.S. 611 (1968).
, Fortas and Douglas, JJ., dissented from the majority's refusal to find Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), applicable. 390 U.S. at 622.
08391 U.S. 308 (1968).
"Id. at 311.
,o Id. The footnote to this textual statement is also pertinent. Id. at 311 n.2.
,1362 U.S. 501 (1946).
7' 391 U.S. at 328.
3 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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to express an idea."74 In disentangling in these hybrid situations the
protected, communicative from the unprotected, noncommunicative as-
pects, there is no escape for the Court from factual judgments and de-
terminations essential to a pricking out of the constitutional line separating
invalidity from validity.
Peyton v. Rowd 5 provides a transition to decisions of the 1967 Term
involving extensions of constitutional principle, although the procedural
right in question was assumed rather than announced. The direct issue
was the proper interpretation of federal legislation that specifies that
the federal trial courts may issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
prisoners in custody in violation of the United States Constitution. Both
petitioners, incarcerated in the Virginia state penitentiary, sought review
of sentences later to be served, on the ground of inadequate represen-
tation by trial counsel. The federal district court had followed Mc-
Nally v. Hill,77 to hold that this basic section of the federal habeas
corpus statutes does not authorize attacks upon future consecutive sen-
tences."' The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which had declined to adhere to McNally.70  During the course of
the Chief Justice's opinion for an undivided Court there appears the
following:
Of course prejudice to meritorious claims resulting from the kind
of delay which McNally imposes is not limited to situations involving
ineffective assistance of counsel. To name but a few examples, fac-
tual determinations are often dispositive of claims of forced confes-
sion . ..lack of competency to stand trial .. .and denial of a fair
trial .... 80
The Court's language is inclusive enough to group with other viola-
tions of acknowledged procedural rights the denial of effective assistance
of counsel by reason of counsel's own professional inadequacy,8' and ex-
4Id. at 376.
7.391 U.S. 54 (1968).7'28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964).
17293 U.S. 131 (1934).
71391 U.S. at 56-57.
" Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).80 391 U.S. at 62 (citations omitted).
" The right to effective assistance of counsel, in the sense of protection against
inadequacy in federal or state criminal law administration, was first established by
Powell v. Alabama, 278 U.S. 45 (1932), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). Inadequacy on the part of appointed or retained counsel has been made
a basis for reversal by some lower state and federal courts. Note, Incompetence
of Defense Counsel, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1081 (1966).
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pressly recognizes that in resolving constitutional claims of the types of
which the cited ones are examples, "factual determinations are often
dispositive."' 2
The Court stated in Duncan v. Louisiana13 that
[b]ecause we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.8 4
Companion decisions to Duncan expressly include within the guaranty
trials of criminal contempt 5 but exclude petty offenses.8s Left for future
adjudication is the question whether, to employ a phrase of Justice Fortas,
"the tail must go with the hide," i.e., whether this means that the states
are bound by the interpretation of the sixth amendment as requiring
juries of twelve, unanimous verdicts, and trial superintendence by a judge
empowered to advise on the facts as well as to instruct on the law.8 7 Im-
portant as are these decreed and potential extensions of constitutional
principle, they do not involve a drawing of constitutional lines requiring
factual determinations of difficulty. Quite the contrary, however, is true
with regard to the extension by Witherspoon v. Illinois"' of the dimen-
sions of the concept of jury impartiality. The constitutional classifica-
tions drawn by the majority, which Mr. Justice Douglas declared he
"fail[ed] to see or understand"8 9 and which Justices Black, Harlan and
White vigorously rejected, ° require for their effective implementation
factual determinations of great psychological subtlety and difficulty.
While Ginsberg v. New York9 may be said to have extended the
Roth principle to the special problem of the juvenile reader and viewer,
it did so in the inverse sense of delimiting the scope of the free speech
guaranty as contrasted with its reach where adults are involved. With
the new constitutional line between adult and juvenile apparently to be
determined by age, Ginsberg does not of itself present a further problem
of any seriousness in fact determination. Yet the establishment of two
82 391 U.S. at 62.
82391 U.S. 145 (1968).8 1 Id. at 149.
" Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
" Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
" Mr. Justice Fortas makes a strong case for not imposing this "bag and bag-
gage" on the States. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213-14 (1968).88 391 U.S. 510 (1968).80 Id. at 524.
0 Id. at 532-42.
81390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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broad classifications, with differing constitutional limits, cannot but com-
plicate the already difficult factual determinations that must be made in
obscenity cases in order to mark what is within and what is without the
guaranty.
Decisions of the 1967 Term included major extensions of the con-
stitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Katz v.
United States,92 overruling Olmstead v. United States,9" finally did what
the original reconstructed Court was expected but failed to do,"4 and
thereby raised from minority to majority status the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in one of his greatest dissents. "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places" ;05 once this is recognized, "it
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."0
While the new doctrine relieves the Court of finespun factual determina-
tions regarding technical trespass, highlighted by the "spike mike" case, 7
it surely will entail other decisive questions of fact as the Court delineates
its pronouncement that the fourth amendment not only "protects individ-
ual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,"0 s but also
goes further to afford protection in matters that "often have nothing to
do with privacy at all."0"
The "stop and frisk" decisions""0 are illustrative. With the amend-
ment protecting people, not places, petitioner in Terry v. Ohio"'0 was
entitled to fourth amendment protection as he walked down a street in
Cleveland. Whether a warrantless detention by police is a reasonable
search and seizure requires a balancing of public against private interest.
Continuing, the Court declared:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this
type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protec-
tion of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is deal-
ing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime ...
2 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
03277 U.S. 438 (1928).
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
3'389 U.S. at 351.90Id. at 353.
°* Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
389 U.S. at 350.9
°Id.
"00 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ; Peters v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
101392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limita-
tions which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure
and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed
in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron
v. New York... decided today.10 2
The "concrete factual circumstances" that the Court proceeded to review
in the three cases led to varying results. In Terry, the Court con-
cluded that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evi-
dence against him; in Sibron, that the patrolman's testimony revealed
no such facts as would bring the self-protective search for weapons within
the limited area of validity. In the Peters case,103 argued and decided
with Sibron, a close inquiry into the record facts led to the conclusion
that the search was constitutionally reasonable. So it will have to be, in
future litigation under this new dimension of the fourth amendment,
that "constitutional fact" plays a controlling role.
THE RESULTING DILEMMA
Within the Court there were at the 1967 Term two expressions of
concern over the burden of continuing adherence to the doctrine of "con-
stitutional fact." Concurring in the Peters affirmance but dissenting from
the Sibrom reversal, Mr. Justice Black put much emphasis on the problem:
In appraising the facts as I have I realize that the Court has chosen
to draw inferences different from mine and those drawn by the courts
below .... But this Court is hardly, at this distance from the place
and atmosphere of the trial, in a position to overturn the trial and
appellate courts on its own independent finding of an unspoken "prem-
ise" of the officer's inner thoughts.
In acting upon its own findings and rejecting those of the lower
state courts, this Court, sitting in the marble halls of the Supreme
Court Building in Washington, D.C., should be most cautious. Due
to our holding in Mapp v. Ohio . . . we are due to get for review lit-
erally thousands of cases raising questions like those before us here.
If we are setting ourselves meticulously to review all such findings
our task will be endless and many will rue the day when Mapp was
decided. It is not only wise but imperative that where findings of the
facts of reasonableness and probable cause are involved in such cases,
we should not overturn state court findings unless on the most ex-
travagant and egregious errors. It seems fantastic to me even to sug-
gest that this is such a case. I would leave these state court holdings
alone.104
"' Id. at 27, 29 (emphasis added).
" Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
1 392 U.S. at 81-82 (citation omitted).
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Earlier in the Term, concurring and dissenting in the obscenity cases,
Mr. Justice Harlan had followed his earlier-quoted paragraph on the
"difference among us .. . in reviewing obscenity determinations"'' 10  by
observing that
[t] he upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who
undertakes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have
held particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself
in utter bewilderment. From the standpoint of the Court itself the
current approach has required us to spend an inordinate amount of
time in the absurd business of perusing and viewing the miserable
stuff that pours into the Court, mostly in state cases, all to no better
end than second-guessing state judges.10
The Justice's solution of the situation is not, however, abandonment of
independent judgment by the Court. 0 7 Rather, he proposes modification
in substantive constitutional doctrine:
I believe that no improvement in this chaotic state of affairs is
likely to come until it is recognized that this whole problem is pri-
marily one of state concern, and that the Constitution tolerates much
wider authority and discretion in the States to control the dissem-
ination of obscene materials than it does in the Federal Government.
Reiterating the viewpoint that I have expressed in earlier opinions,
I would limit federal control of obscene materials to those which all
would recognize as what has been called "hard core pornography,"
and would withhold the federal judicial hand from interfering with
state determinations except in instances where the state action clearly
appears to be but the product of prudish over-zealousness.... And in
the juvenile field I think that the Constitution is still more tolerant
of state policy and its applications. If current doctrinaire views as to
the reach of the First Amendment into state affairs are thought to
stand in the way of such a functional approach, I would revert to basic
constitutional concepts that until recent times have been recognized
and respected as the fundamental genius of our federal system, name-
ly the acceptance of wide state autonomy in local affairs.'08
Mr. Justice Harlan's proposal for modification in substantive doctrine
in obscenity litigation involving state regulation, as a solution to the
... See p. 318 supra.
... Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968).
"7 This view accords with the continuing absence of any criticism of the doc-
trine by commentators. The explanation of this commentator attitude lies in the
fact that since 1937 the doctrine has been applied in civil liberty, rather than eco-
nomic liberty, litigation. More extensive comment may be found in Strong, supra
note 1, passint.108 390 U.S. at 707-08.
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problem of the burden cast on the Court by the doctrine of "constitutional
fact," is the first to be made overtly. One wonders, however, whether
it represents the first time that this consideration has influenced Jus-
tices in advancing proposals for doctrinal change at the substantive con-
stitutional level. At the close of the earlier, detailed analysis of "the
persistent doctrine of constitutional fact"10 9 the suggestion was ven-
tured that
[a]lthough Justices Black and Douglas, in making their case for
an absolute interpretation of the first amendment, primarily stress the
historical evidence as to the meaning of that guarantee there is also
basis for believing that another string to their judicial bow is the bur-
den on the Court resulting from the combination of a highly fact-con-
trolled constitutional line and felt need for independent judgment as
to those facts."10
But beyond this, and of greater significance, is the question whether a
majority of the Court has been influenced by the threatened burden in
fashioning new substantive constitutional doctrine. The writer's study
of the long line of forced confession cases has convinced him that Esco-
bedo"' and Miranda " are in great part a consequence of the Court's
growing concern over the heavy burden of independent review in this
class of constitutional litigation." 3 Quaere whether the recent extension
of Miranda, by a divided Court in Mathis v. United States,'" casts any
additional light on the matter. Certainly Mr. Justice Fortas' powerful
dissent, in Avery v. Midland County,"5 from the Court's extension to
local governments of the "one man, one vote" requirement of Reynolds
v. Sims,"0 invites speculation as to whether the burden imposed by the
doctrine of "constitutional fact" has figured in Court resolution of the
major constitutional issue precipitated by malapportionment in legisla-
tive bodies.
Rejecting the Court's "simplistic approach" in the Avery case, Mr.
Justice Fortas declared it to be his belief
"0 Strong, supra note 1.11Od. at 282-83.
111Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
... The earlier analysis of the forced confession cases appears in Strong, supra
note 1, at 249-61.
11 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (application of Miranda requirements to questioning by
an Internal Revenue Agent of a person in a state penitentiary after conviction for
a crime wholly unrelated to his allegedly fraudulent claims for Federal income
tax refunds).115390 U.S. 474, 495 (1968).
116 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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that in the circumstances of this case equal protection of the laws may
be achieved-and perhaps can only be achieved-by a system which
takes into account a complex of values and factors, and not merely the
arithmetic simplicity of one equals one. Dusch and Sailors were wisely
and prudently decided. They reflect a reasoned, conservative, em-
pirical approach to the intricate problem of applying constitutional
principle to the complexities of local government. I know of no reason
why we now abandon this reasonable and moderate approach to the
problem of local suffrage and adopt an absolute and inflexible formula
which is potentially destructive of important political and social
values. There is no reason why we should insist that there is and can
be only one rule for voters in local government units-that districts
for units of local government must be drawn solely on the basis of
population. I believe there are powerful reasons why, while insisting
upon reasonable regard for the population-suffrage ratio, we should
reject a rigid, theoretical, and authoritarian approach to the problems
of local government. In this complex and involved area, we should be
careful and conservative in our application of constitutional impera-
tives, for they are powerful.
Constitutional commandments are not surgical instruments. They
have a tendency to back deeply-to amputate. And while I have no
doubt that, with the growth of suburbia and exurbia, the problem of al-
locating local government functions and benefits urgently requires at-
tention, I am persuaded that it does not call for the hatchet of one man,
one vote. It is our duty to insist upon due regard for the value of the
individual vote but not to ignore realities or to bypass the alternatives
that legislative alteration might provide.
117
Continuing with his thesis, the Justice registered acceptance of the
Court's "one man, one vote rule" of the 1964 Reapportionment Cases:
This rule is appropriate to the selection of members of a State Leg-
islature ... But the same cannot be said of all local governmental units,
and certainly not of the unit involved in this case. Midland County's
Commissioners Court has special functions-directed primarily to its
rural area and rural population. Its powers are limited and specialized,
in light of its missions. Residents of Midland County do not by any
means have the same rights and interests at stake in the election of
the Commissioners. Equal protection of their rights may certainly
take into account the reality of the rights and interests of the various
segments of the voting population. It does not require that they all be
treated alike, regardless of the stark difference in the impact of the
2 7390 U.S. at 496-97. Two paragraphs earlier Justice Fortas had observed
that "we accepted as passing the scrutiny of the Constitution, the less-than-mathe-
matically perfect plans in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), and Sailors v.
Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967)." Id. at 496. For comment on these
cases in a North Carolina context, see Pollitt & Strong, Constitutional Law, Sur-
vey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REV. 855, 866-69 (1967).
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Commissioners Court upon them. "Equal protection" relates to the
substance of citizens' rights and interests. It demands protection
adapted to substance; it does not insist upon, or even permit, prescrip-
tion by arbitrary formula which wrongly assumes that the interests
of all citizens in the elected body are the same.
In my judgment, the Court departs from Reynolds when it holds,
broadly and generally, that "the Fourteenth Amendment . . . forbids
the election of local government officials from districts of disparate
population." This holding, literally applied as the Court commands,
completely ignores the complexities of local government in the United
States-complexities which, Reynolds itself states, demand latitude
of prescription. The simplicity of the Court's ruling today does not com-
port with the lack of simplicity which characterizes the miscellany
which constitutes our local governments." 8
Also dissenting in Avery, Justice Stewart stated his agreement
with most of what is said in the thorough dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Fortas. Indeed, I would join that opinion were it not for the
author's unquestioning endorsement of the doctrine of Reynolds v.
Sims .... I continue to believe that the Court's opinion in that case
misapplied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-that the apportionment of the legislative body of a sovereign
State, no less than the apportionment of a county government, is far
too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic. My views on
that score, set out at length elsewhere, closely parallel those expressed
by Mr. Justice Fortas in the present case." 9
Justice Stewart's elaboration of his views had occurred in Lucas v.
General Assembly, ° one of the 1964 Reapportionment Cases. General
familiarity with that strong dissent, in which Justice Clark joined, neces-
sitates quotation here of only the following telling passage:
Representative government is a process of accommodating group
interests through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function
is to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the
people of a State into the making of the State's public policy. Appro-
priate legislative apportionment, therefore, should ideally be designed
to insure effective representation in the State's legislature, in coopera-
tion with other organs of political power, of the various groups and
interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course, this ideal
is approximated in the particular apportionment system of any State
by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting po-
118 390 U.S. at 498-99.
"l Id. at 510.
'" 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964).
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litical forces operating within the State . . . .The Court today de-
dines to give any recognition to these considerations and countless
others, tangible and intangible, in holding unconstitutional the par-
ticular systems of legislative apportionment which these States have
chosen. Instead, the Court says that the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause can be met in any State only by the uncritical,
simplistic, and heavy-handed application of sixth-grade arithmetic. 121
Dissent from the simplistic approach has not been limited to minority
Justices. One of the most penetrating has been that of Professor Martin
Shapiro, who, although lauding Baker v. Carr,122 rejects the later reap-
portionment decisions. "The 'one man, one vote' slogan, in equating the
whole of democracy with majority-rule elections represents naive po-
litical philosophy, bad political theory, and no political science.' 1 23 The
reason is that the Reapportionment Cases
fundamentally ignore all that we have learned about group politics.
By adopting the most simplistic view of the political process, and par-
ticularly of the process of representation, the Court equates the elec-
toral and political processes and thinks to assure each citizen "equal
protection of the laws" in the political sphere by giving each citizen
a vote equal to every other's .... A vision of the political process as
no more than the electoral process and of each citizen as exercising
his whole political power in the individual act of voting cannot prop-
erly serve even the most populistic philosophy. For in the complex
politics of group bargaining and shifting temporary majorities that
we actually have in the United States, inequalities in voting strength
may contribute to the overall equality of all participants in the po-
litical process as a whole. Blanket and blind enforcement of electoral
equality will only decrease the political inequalities in some states
at the cost of increasing them in others. The result of the Court's new
rulings in terms of real political equality will be largely random. In
the end they may achieve somewhat greater over-all equality but only
because the sum of new equalities will exceed the sum of new in-
equalities. 24
Writing earlier, before the 1964 decisions, Dean Neal was convinced
that
[w]hat has been said [his analysis] is enough to show that equal-
ity of voting weight is scarcely any guide to the reasonableness or
fairness of a state's representation plan. As a standard of performance
1211 d. at 749-50.
122369 U.S. 186 (1962).
123M. SHAPIRO, LAw AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME CouRT 250 (1964).
"'Id. at 249.
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it is about as adequate an instrument as would be a ruler for judging
a work of sculpture or a metronome a symphony orchestra. 2 5
The difficulty is not
the validity of the equal-vote principle but only its insufficiency. This
is an important point, however, for its advocates have tended to speak
as though all other factors entering into a representation formula are
departures-tolerable, perhaps, but only within limits-from the one
true principle of equally weighted votes, rather than as reflecting
equally important principles with which the assumed principle of
equality may have to be accommodated.126
It is of course true that other commentators have found the nose-
count approach to equality in representation entirely adequate in itself, 17
and this may well be true of the majority of the Supreme Court. Another
interpretation of the Court's reapportionment decisions is, however, pos-
sible. This is that the Court, feeling impelled to try its hand with the
seemingly intractable problem of fair representation so fundamental to
a democratic political system, chose the rule of mathematical equality not
for its merits but because its successful implementation appeared to be
within the Court's limited capacity for dealing with political problems
of these dimensions. In a recent lengthy analysis of the institutional
aspects of the Supreme Court and, in considerable part, of the Shapiro
volume, Professor Jan Deutsch explains (and justifies) the rule of the
Reapportionment Cases on the basis that the symbolic role which the
Court plays and the institutional arrangements through which it oper-
ates would not permit the degree and extent of inquiry required by "a
comprehensive analysis of the distribution of political power through-
out the state."' 2 The Deutsch conclusion is that
[i]t will not do, therefore, to approve the decision in Baker v.
Carr and then to disavow the principle arrived at in the Reappor-
tionment Cases, for the institutional needs of the Court and the in-
terplay between the demands made upon it by its symbolic function
and the requirement that decisions be based on evidence contained in
12 Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 252,
282.12
0 Id. at 277.
"I R. McKay, RAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRE-
SENTATION (1965); Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person-One
Vote, One Vote-One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1. Cf. R. HANSON, THE POLITICAL
THICKET 102-119 (1966); Krastin, The Implementation of Representative Govern-
went in a Democracy, 48 IowA L. REv. 549 (1963).
.2 Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitinzacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersec-
tions Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 248 (1968).
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the record inevitably resulted in the adoption of a standard that does
not require involvement of the judiciary in the spectacle portrayed
above-in short, "one man, one vote." The significant question in
the apportionment controversy is the one that both Stewart and Sha-
piro ignore, the analogue to the question Wechsler must be taken to
have answered in the negative in assessing the Brown decision:
Whether, given the fact that a "one man, one vote" standard would
have to be applied, the consequences of malapportionments were suffi-
ciently serious that greater injury would have been done to the
Court's prestige by a refusal to deal with them than by the public
controversy that application of that standard aroused.
2 9
Within these larger, institutional considerations lies, the present
writer believes, the downright practical, earthy factor of judicial burden
resulting in great part from the doctrine of "constitutional fact." In
looking to its outward image the Court must consider its inner oper-
ations, lest an overburdened institution be unable to put its best face
forward. It may well be that the inarticulate minor premise of the Re-
apportionment Cases of 1964 and now of 1968's Avery decision comes
to this: If the Court must enter the quagmire of malapportionment in
order to save the country for democracy, avoidance of the quicksands of
total involvement necessitates satisfaction with an oversimple, yet man-
ageable, measure of constitutionality. In a nutshell, the Court can ef-
fectively manage independent review of sixth-grade arithmetic but not
of college calculus.
The situation has come to a serious pass if pressure from the "con-
stitutional fact" doctrine colors the Court's judgment in its central task
of drawing the boundaries of constitutionality. Yet abandonment of the
doctrine is not the answer to the dilemma. That would free the Court
in its determination of constitutional limits only to deny it effective means
for implementation of its substantive judgments. Neither Court nor
commentator is proposing to jettison in the area of civil, personal, and
political liberty, the practice of independent Court judgment with respect
to facts decisive of constitutional issues. Quite the contrary, as pointed
out in this and the earlier study.' The virulent attack on the doctrine
in the 1920's and 1930's is not now to be seriously taken as a call for
abandonment; in retrospect it appears that that attack was in essence a
facet of the buildup against Court protection of economic interests through
"'Id. at 248-49 (italics in the original). The reference to the "Brown decision"
is to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"" In accord, on the issue of obscenity, is Comment, The Scope of Supreme
Court Review in Obscenity Cases, 1965 DUKE L.J. 596.
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favorable interpretation of the commerce and due process clauses. 1 ' There
is a compelling inner logic to the doctrine of "constitutional fact" once
it is separated from emotional biases respecting the values for which the
Court should provide substantive protection. 32 The writer earlier sug-
gested that reduction in Court burden might be accomplished by adjust-
ing scope of review to "the gravity of the risk of error" in the factual de-
terminations made below.33 Yet the development of adequate standards
of measurement of such gravity for different categories of reviewing sit-
uations, and the necessity for their continuing evaluation in light of
changing circumstances, create doubt as to whether on balance the bur-
den on the Court could be significantly lightened by this method. Some
further solution must be found for mitigation of the Court's mounting
workload.
3 4
131 Strong, smipra note 1, at 224-40.
x" Strong, supra note 36, at 271, 275.
1. Strong, supra note 1, at 283.
1
. In a subsequent article in this Review the writer will propose a solution
adequate to meet the increasingly critical situation in the Court's burden caused
by several developments of which persistence of the "constitutional fact" doctrine
is one.
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